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Abstract 
When people are the victims of greed or recipients of generosity, their first impulse is often to 
pay back that behavior in kind. What happens when people cannot reciprocate, but instead have 
the chance to be cruel or kind to someone entirely different—to pay it forward?  In five 
experiments, participants received greedy, equal, or generous divisions of money or labor from 
an anonymous person, and then divided additional resources with a new anonymous person. 
While equal treatment was paid forward in kind, greed was paid forward more than generosity. 
This asymmetry was driven by negative affect, such that a positive affect intervention disrupted 
the tendency to pay greed forward.  Implications for models of generalized reciprocity are 
discussed. 
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Paying it Forward and the Limits of Generosity 
Paying it forward is a heart-warming notion, one that has long captured the attention 
of luminaries—Ralph Waldo Emerson (1841) and Benjamin Franklin (1784)—laypeople (Hyde, 
2000), psychologists (Bartlett & Desteno, 2006; Fowler & Christakis, 2010), evolutionary 
biologists (Bshary & Grutter, 2006; Rutte & Taborsky, 2007), and game theorists (Diekmann, 
2004; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Putnam, 2001). The concept is simple: A is kind to B, and B—
rather than paying that kindness back to A—pays it forward to C. C then pays that kindness 
forward to D, and so on, creating a chain of goodwill. Paying kindness forward—or “generalized 
reciprocity”—operates according to a simple maxim: “help anyone, if helped by someone” 
(Rankin & Taborsky, 2009).  On any given day, however, people are the recipients of not only 
kind or generous behavior (“help”), but also of equal and greedy treatment. Which kind of 
behavior—equality, greed, or generosity—is more likely to be paid forward?  We predict that 
while equality will be consistently paid forward, greed will propagate more than generosity. 
Paying it forward is typically researched in its most prototypical—and optimistic—form, 
with both experiments and mathematical models demonstrating the propagation of generosity in 
both humans (Bartlett & Desteno, 2006; Stanca, 2009), and animals (Rankin & Taborsky, 2009).  
These chains of goodwill, however, are unstable because they are easily exploited by defectors—
that is, those who receive generosity without being generous to others.  Therefore, it has been 
hypothesized that positive paying it forward (i.e., generalized reciprocity) evolves primarily 
when communities are interdependent, genetically related, or contain small sub-groups (Barta, 
McNamara, Huszár, & Taborsky, 2011; van Doorn & Taborsky, 2011; Rankin & Taborsky, 
2009).  Some research suggests that people will pay forward generosity without strict 
interdependence (Bartlett & Desteno, 2006; DeSteno, Bartlett, Baumann, Williams, & Dickens, Paying it Forward  4 
2010; Dufwenberg, Gneezy, Güth & van Damme; Fowler & Christakis, 2010; Hamilton & 
Taborsky, 2005; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Stanca, 2009); however these paradigms often give 
the appearance of interdependence because they involve both extensive interpersonal interaction 
and/or small group settings—factors which are generally missing from naturally occurring (or 
“well-mixed”) social groups (Rankin & Taborsky, 2009). In contrast to these paradigms, real-
world—and media accounts—of paying it forward often involve brief, one-time encounters with 
strangers (e.g., choosing to pay a stranger’s layaway bill; Beck, 2011).  The first goal of the 
current experiments is to examine whether behavior is paid forward in such anonymous 
situations. 
The second goal is to examine which kinds of behavior are paid forward. Past research 
has investigated only one class of behavior—minimally altruistic behavior (i.e., small acts of 
help)—but here we distinguish between equality, generosity, and greed.  Research suggests that 
equality is a deep-seated behavioral norm: at default, people split outcomes equally (i.e., 50/50; 
Messick & Schell, 1992), and even children and dogs show inequality aversion (Fehr, Bernhard, 
& Rockenbach, 2008; Range, Horn, Viranyi, & Huber, 2009).  As a result, we predict that when 
people receive equality, they will pay forward this treatment in kind.  Equality can be violated in 
both the positive (more-than-fairness) and negative (less-than-fairness) directions, and it is 
unknown whether these behaviors are differentially paid forward
1.   Generosity may propagate 
more than greed because generosity seems relatively rarer—at least to the news-watching 
layperson—and the amplified associated affective reactions engendered by rare and novel events 
may compel people to pay forward generosity (Ohman, Eriksson, Fredrikson, Hugdahl, & 
                                                 
1 We note that economists and evolutionary biologists consider any behavior above pure self-interest as generous. 
Here we define generosity as treating others more than equally (i.e., more than fair), so that we can tease apart the 
relative effects of different kinds of positive behaviors.  Paying it Forward  5 
Olofsson, 1974).   Arguing for the relative power of greed over generosity, however, is an 
extensive body of research showing that negative stimuli evoke stronger responses and exert a 
greater influence on subsequent human and animal behavior than do positive stimuli 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer & Vohs, 2001; Fiske, 1980; Ito, Larsen, Smith & 
Cacioppo, 1998; Keysar, Converse, Wang & Epley, 2008; Rutte et al, 2006; Taylor, 1991; but 
see Wang, Galinsky, & Murnighan, 2009). As a result, we predict that greed would be paid 
forward more than generosity. 
Our third goal is to examine the underlying affective drivers of paying behavior forward.  
While positive emotions (e.g., gratitude) lead people to pay forward generosity (Bartlett & 
DeSteno, 2006; DeSteno et al., 2010), these investigations do not include conditions under which 
people received equal or greedy treatment.  Receiving greed likely engenders negative affect 
(Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003), which in turn typically exerts more 
influence than positive affect; thus, we predicted that negative affect will drive paying it forward 
behavior when considering the full suite of behaviors: equality, generosity, and greed. 
Overview of the Experiments 
  We explore paying forward greed, equality and generosity in the form of both money 
(Experiments 1 and 2) and labor (Experiments 3, 4a and 4b). Experiment 2 explores the potential 
effect of overall resource distribution on paying forward greed versus generosity by manipulating 
recipients’ initial financial endowment.  Experiments 4a and 4b investigated the role of affect in 
paying it forward via both mediation and moderation. 
Experiment 1: Paying Forward Money 
 One-hundred participants (51 female, Mage = 23.4) were recruited from subway stations 
and high traffic tourist areas in a Northeastern city.  After giving consent, individual participants Paying it Forward  6 
were led to an isolated bench and told they would play an anonymous economic game in which 
one person splits money between themselves and another person (i.e., a dictator game).   
Participants were assigned to one of four conditions.  In the control condition (the give-
only condition), participants assumed the role of the “splitter” in a standard dictator game, and 
received $6 to split between themselves and an anonymous future receiver.  They kept as much 
as they wished, then sealed the rest in an envelope labeled “future receiver” and returned it to the 
experimenters. 
In the three other conditions (the greedy, equality, and generous pay-it-forward 
conditions), each participant acted as both the receiver and the splitter.  First, these participants 
received an envelope with money ostensibly left to them by a previous splitter.  Upon opening 
the envelope, they saw that the previous splitter had given them a greedy ($0 of $6), equal ($3 of 
$6), or generous ($6 of $6) split.  Participants rated the fairness of this split on a 5-point scale (1: 
much less than fair, 3: fair, 5: much more than fair). Participants then acted as the splitter in a 
second dictator game, splitting an additional $6 between themselves and a different future 
receiver. Thus, participants in the three pay-it-forward conditions played the central link in a 
three-person chain—first receiving then splitting.  The amount given to the future receiver was 
our measure of paying-it-forward. 
Results 
The pay-it-forward conditions differed in perceived fairness, F(2, 71) = 86.35, p < .001, 
with the greed (M = 1.56, SD = .82), equality (M = 3.16, SD = .37), and generous (M = 4.42, SD 
= .97) conditions all differing from each other, all ts > 8.73, all ps < .001. 
The amount paid forward varied by condition, F(3, 96) = 9.09, p < .001. As seen in 
Figure 1, participants in the greedy condition gave the least, followed by those in the give-only Paying it Forward  7 
condition, followed by the equality and generous conditions. All conditions differed from one 
another, all ts > 2.14, all ps < .05, except for the equality and the generous groups, t(48) = .61, p 
= .55.
 2 Relative to the give-only condition, receiving greed led participants to be more selfish 
and receiving equal or generous outcomes led people to be more generous. However, receiving 
generosity did not prompt any greater generosity than receiving equal treatment, despite the fact 
that these treatments differed in terms of perceived fairness.  
 
Figure 1: Money paid forward (out of a possible $6.00) in each condition (Experiment 1).  
 
We also compared the difference between the amount received and the amount given in 
each condition—the closer this value is to zero, the more closely people paid their treatment 
                                                 
2 This experiment revealed a significant condition by sex interaction in the pay-it-forward conditions, F(2,68) = 
7.46, p < .01, whereby women gave more money in the greedy and generous conditions, but men gave more money 
in the equality condition.  However, none of the subsequent experiments replicated these findings—or revealed any 
other significant sex differences—and so these specific results are assumed to be a product of reasonably small 
number of men and women in each condition.     Paying it Forward  8 
forward in kind.  The one-way ANOVA was significant, F(2, 72) = 7.15, p = .001. Equality 
(Mdifference = .38) was paid forward more than greed (Mdifference = 1.36), p < .05, which was paid 
forward marginally more than generosity (Mdifference = 2.29), p = .07. Thus, behavior appears to 
be paid forward in anonymous interactions, but the extent depends on the type of behavior: 
equality propagates most, and greed propagates more than generosity.   
Experiment 2: Manipulating Endowment 
Experiment 1 does not differentiate the impact of social phenomena—receiving a greedy 
or generous split from another person—from the effects of simply having a larger or smaller 
endowment. In Experiment 2, we randomly endowed people with either $0 or $6 before they 
received greedy or generous splits, and predicted that greed and generosity would influence 
paying-it-forward more than mere endowment. 
Method 
One hundred participants (50 female, Mage = 24.3) were recruited as in Experiment 1.  
This experiment followed a 2 (initial random endowment: lucky or unlucky) × 2 (social 
treatment: greedy or generous) design.  Participants first picked three numbers then rolled a die.  
If one of their lucky numbers came up, they were given $6 (lucky condition), if not, they received 
$0 (unlucky condition).  Following this endowment, the procedure was identical to the greedy 
and generous conditions of Experiment 1. 
Results 
A 2 (initial random endowment: lucky or unlucky) × 2 (social treatment: greedy or 
generous) ANOVA revealed main effect of social treatment on paying it forward, F(3, 95) = 
8.19, p < .01, but no main effect for initial random endowment, F(3, 95) = 1.42, p > .23, and no 
interaction, F(3, 95) = 0.46, p > .49. Those who received a greedy split paid forward less than Paying it Forward  9 
those who received a generous split (Figure 2); those who had received $0 or $6 due to luck were 
less likely to pay this behavior forward, suggesting that social treatment plays a role in paying 
behavior forward over and above one’s endowment.  
When both social treatment and the initial random endowment were entered as 
simultaneous predictors for paying it forward in a regression, social treatment significantly 
predicted paying it forward behavior, β = .30, t(97) = 3.15, p < .005 , but not initial endowment, 
β = .15, t(97) = 1.50, p = .13.  More descriptively, the fact that those who received a total of $12 
(who were lucky and received generosity) paid forward only 21¢ more than those who received 
$6 (who were unlucky and received generosity) further suggests that endowment is not driving 
our effects.
3  As before, the relative difference between money received and money paid forward 
revealed that greed (Mdifference = 1.81) was paid forward more than generosity (Mdifference = 3.02), 
F(1, 95) = 8.60, p < .005.  
 
                                                 
3 Perhaps the most compelling argument against the role of endowment in paying it forward is that, in Experiment 1, 
equality was paid forward most of all despite having an endowment in between greed and generosity.  In other 
words, if endowment was driving the effect, one would expect that generosity (total endowment: $12) should be 
paid forward most, followed by equality (total endowment: $9), followed by greed (total endowment: $6)—which is 
not the observed pattern of data.   Paying it Forward  10 
Figure 2: Money paid forward (out of a possible $6.00), after receiving both a random initial 
endowment and a social treatment of either greed or generosity (Experiment 2).   
 
Experiment 3: Paying Forward Labor 
Experiments 3, 4a and 4b explore paying it forward using a different currency: labor.  In 
life, there are both enjoyable and onerous tasks, with the deeds of others leaving people with 
more or less of each; we explored whether people who received greedy and generous divisions of 
tasks paid forward that treatment to others. In addition, we test paying-it-forward in an inherently 
anonymous environment: an internet-based labor market. 
Method 
  Participants (N = 60, 12 female; Mage = 26.9 years) were recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk, an online labor recruitment tool (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011); most 
importantly, the tool allowed us to recruit participants who would engage in truly anonymous, 
fleeting interactions.  As in Experiments 1 and 2, participants were told that they were the middle 
link in an anonymous chain (in this case, a chain of labor): they would first play the role of the 
receiver, then that of the splitter.  The experiment consisted of both good tasks (rating humorous 
stimuli) and bad tasks (circling vowels in dense foreign text); each split consisted of a total of 
four tasks (two good, two bad). 
  Participants first received either a greedy split (the previous participant had completed 
both good tasks, leaving only bad tasks for the current participant) or a generous split (the 
previous participant had completed both bad tasks, leaving only good ones).  Participants then 
acted as the splitter, deciding how to split an additional four tasks between themselves and an 
anonymous future participant.  They could pay forward either greed (leaving both bad tasks), Paying it Forward  11 
equality (leaving one good and one bad task), or generosity (leaving both good tasks).  Finally, 
participants completed their four tasks (two given from the previous participant, and the two not 
given to the future participant).  The number of good tasks left for the future anonymous 
participant (0, 1, or 2) was our measure of paying it forward.   
Results 
The number of good tasks participants assigned to the future participant varied by 
condition, F(1, 58) = 5.69, p = .02. Participants in the greedy condition (M = 0.50, SD = .57) 
gave significantly fewer good tasks than participants in the generous condition (M = 0.86, SD = 
.59). We again assessed the extent to which behaviors were paid forward by comparing the 
difference between good tasks received and given. A one-way ANOVA revealed significant 
differences in paying it forward, F(1, 58) = 18.42, p < .001; as before, greed (Mdifference = 0.50) 
was paid forward more than generosity (Mdifference = 1.14).  
Experiment 4a: Negative Affect and Paying it Forward 
In Experiments 4a and 4b, we explore whether the asymmetry in paying forward greed 
versus generosity is driven by negative affect, and provide converging evidence by using both 
mediation (Experiment 4a) and moderation (Experiment 4b) approaches (Spencer, Zanna & 
Fong, 2005).   
Method 
Experiment 4a explicitly tested for potential mediation by both general positive affect and 
general negative affect, as well as a commonly studied discrete negative emotion: anger (Allred, 
Mallozzi, Matsui & Raia, 1997).  In contrast to previous studies that investigated only good 
deeds (e.g., Bartlett & Desteno, 2006), we predicted that the inclusion of greed would lead 
negative affect to be the best predictor of overall paying it forward behavior; moreover, we Paying it Forward  12 
predicted that generalized negative affect would be more powerful than the specific negative 
emotion of anger in predicting pay it forward behavior (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996).   
Ninety-six participants (63 female, Mage = 30.1) were recruited as in Experiment 1. 
Similar to Experiment 3, participants completed a series of tasks: good tasks consisted of making 
free associations to words, and bad tasks consisted of circling the vowels in dense Italian prose 
(Figure 3). Each participant was given eight tasks—four good and four bad—to split between 
themselves and a future participant; participants completed half of the eight tasks in any 
combination before passing on the remaining tasks by placing them in an envelope addressed to 
a "Future Participant."  In the give-only condition, participants completed four of the eight tasks 
and passed on the remainder. In the three pay-it-forward conditions, participants first learned that 
a previous participant (the splitter) had been asked to split eight tasks and had left them either a 
generous (completing all four bad and leaving them all four good tasks), greedy (completing all 
four good and leaving them all four bad tasks), or equal division of labor (completing two tasks 
of each kind). 
 Paying it Forward  13 
Figure 3: Examples of a “good task” (left) and a “bad task” (right) given to participants in 
Experiment 4.  
Immediately after receiving this split, participants completed an abbreviated Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988), indicating the extent to 
which they were feeling a variety of positive (happy, enthusiastic, excited, alert, inspired) and 
negative (distressed, upset, afraid, nervous) affective states on 5-point scales (1: not at all, 5: 
extremely).  We also assessed feelings of anger on the same scale.  Participants then rated the 
fairness of the split as in Experiment 1, completed the tasks left for them by the previous player, 
and then acted as a splitter by dividing an additional eight tasks (four good, four bad) between 
themselves and a future anonymous recipient.  The division of tasks passed to the anonymous 
recipient (good v. bad) was our measure of paying it forward. 
Results 
Ratings of task enjoyment (1: not at all enjoyable, 5: extremely enjoyable) confirmed that 
participants found the good tasks (M = 3.57, SD = 1.12) more enjoyable than the bad tasks (M = 
2.62, SD = 1.22), t(95) = 8.38, p < .001.   
Paying it Forward 
The number of good tasks participants assigned to the future participant varied by 
condition, F(3, 87) = 4.23, p < .01.  Participants in the greedy condition gave significantly fewer 
good tasks than participants in all other conditions (all ts > 2.50, all ps < .03; Figure 3). 
Participants in the give-only condition gave the next least, though not significantly less than 
those in the equality or generous conditions, all ts < 1.25, all ps > .22. We again compared the 
difference between amount received and amount given.  The one-way ANOVA was significant, 
F(2, 69) = 24.45, p < .001.  As in Experiment 1, equality (Mdifference = .04) was paid forward more Paying it Forward  14 
than greed (Mdifference = 1.04), p = .001, which was paid forward more than generosity (Mdifference = 
2.08), all ts > 3.45, p < .001.  
 
Figure 4: Good tasks paid forward (out of a possible 4) in each condition (Experiment 4a). 
Affect 
Items from the PANAS were averaged to form separate indices of positive and negative 
affect (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999).  One-way ANOVAs revealed significant 
differences between the three pay-it-forward conditions for negative affect, F(2, 69) = 7.78, p = 
.001, and anger, F(2, 69) = 8.95, p < .001, but not positive affect, F(2, 69) = 1.69, p = .19.  See 
Table 1.  
    Split Type   
Affect Type  Greedy  Equal  Generous 
Negative Affect  1.78 (.86)
a  1.15 (.26)
b  1.19 (.29)
b 
Positive Affect  2.56 (.88)
a  2.61 (.78)
a  2.95 (.68)
a 
Anger  1.96 (1.10)
a  1.12 (.46)
b  1.21 (.51)
b 
       
Note: Means (SD).  For each type of affect, means with a different subscript differ at p < .05.    Paying it Forward  15 
 
Table 1: Participant affect after receiving greedy, generous or equal splits of labor. 
 
Mediation Analysis 
To test whether affect predicted paying-it-forward behavior, positive affect, negative 
affect, and anger were entered in a linear regression predicting good tasks paid forward. Negative 
affect, β = -.33, t(68) = 2.29, p = .025, but not positive affect,  β = .08, p = .47, or anger β = -.10, 
p = .49, predicted paying it forward.  A bootstrapping mediation analysis using 5000 samples 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008) revealed that negative affect mediated the link between tasks received 
(i.e., condition) and tasks paid forward, F(2,69) = 9.07, p < .001, 95% CI [.04, .14]; neither 
positive affect (95% CI [-.01, .08]) nor anger (95% CI [-.01, .14]) mediated this link.   
Interestingly, when positive and negative affect and anger were regressed on paying it 
forward in the generous condition, only positive affect did predict paying forward, β = .41, p = 
.06 (negative affect: β = .07, p = .78; anger: β = .14, p = .51), consistent with previous research 
solely examining paying forward generosity (Bartlett & Desteno, 2006).  Our results suggest, 
however, that when accounting for the full range of deeds— not just generosity, but also greed 
and equality—negative affect best predicts paying it forward.   
Experiment 4b 
  If negative affect drives paying greed forward, then reducing negative affect should have 
the parallel effect of reducing the tendency to pay greed forward.  Experiment 4b introduced a 
filler task between receiving and splitting, to test whether a positive mood intervention would 
moderate pay-it-forward behavior. Relying on previous research demonstrating that viewing 
cartoons repairs a negative mood (Göritz, 2006), we predicted that relative to a neutral task 
(viewing at abstract art), reading cartoons would mitigate paying greed forward. Paying it Forward  16 
Method 
  Participants (N = 165, 88 female; Mage = 30.87) were recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk.   
  This experiment followed a 2 (receive: greedy, generous) × 2 (filler task: neutral, 
positive) design.  We used the same “good” and “bad” tasks as in Experiment 4. Participants first 
received either a greedy split (the previous participant had completed both good tasks, leaving 
only bad tasks for the current participant) or a generous split (the previous participant had 
completed both bad tasks, leaving only good ones).  Participants then rated their liking for either 
three pieces of abstract art (neutral) or three cartoons (positive), before next splitting an 
additional four tasks (two good, two bad) between themselves and an anonymous future 
participant.  We predicted that a positive affect intervention would reduce participants’ tendency 
to pay greed forward. 
Results 
Results from a 2 (receive: greedy, generous) × 2 (filler task: neutral, positive) ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of receiving greed or generosity, F(1, 161) = 3.74, p = .05, no effect of 
filler task, p > .14, and the predicted interaction effect, F(1, 161) = 7.00, p < .01, on the number 
of good tasks given. In the greedy condition, those who completed the neutral filler task (M = 
0.37, SD = .54) paid greed forward more than those in who completed the positive filler task (M 
= 0.78, SD = .63) F(1,161) = 7.94, p < .01. There was no effect of filler task for those who 
received a generous split (Mpositive = 0.71; Mneutral = 0.83); p = .39, suggesting that while reducing 
negative affect reduces paying greed forward, increasing positive affect fails to increase paying 
generosity forward. 
Taken together, Experiments 4a and 4b provide evidence that the tendency to 
asymmetrically pay forward greed stems from negative affect.  In Experiment 4a, negative affect Paying it Forward  17 
mediated the link between tasks received and tasks paid forward; in Experiment 4b, a mood 
improving filler eliminated the paying forward of greed.   
General Discussion 
Five experiments demonstrate that people pay forward behavior in the sorts of fleeting, 
anonymous situations that increasingly typify people’s day-to-day interactions.  These data 
reveal that—in contrast to the focus of media, laypeople, and prior research—true generosity is 
paid forward less than both greed and equality.  Equality leads to equality and greed leads to 
greed, but true generosity results only in a return to equality—an asymmetry driven by the 
greater power of negative affect.  These results are both encouraging and dispiriting.  When 
people receive equality, they rise above their baseline selfishness and pay forward this equality.  
Furthermore, the stability of equality in pay-it-forward situations suggests that this basic level of 
pro-social behavior can propagate even in fully anonymous interactions.  Deviations from 
equality, however, are paid forward only in the negative direction: true generosity prompts only 
equality, whereas greed prompts people to be greedier than they would be at baseline. 
By examining paying it forward in the most parsimonious of environments with a novel 
paradigm, we show that generalized reciprocity can develop without the existence or appearance 
of interdependence—which in turn has implications for biological theories of cooperation.  By 
examining paying it forward generosity, equality and greed of both money and labor we extend 
the study of paying behavior forward to everyday experiences.  Finally, by documenting the 
asymmetry between greed and generosity and the underlying affective mechanism, we highlight 
a more sinister side of paying it forward—and hence human nature—that previous research and 
media attention concerning this phenomenon has largely ignored.  Paying it Forward  18 
We note that our people are not often asked to fill envelopes with small amounts of 
money in their everyday lives, and so the meaningfulness of the task and the generalizability of 
our findings are important questions.  The fact that participants responded consistently to even 
small amounts of money—both behaviorally and affectively—suggests that they did find the 
tasks meaningful and emotionally evocative.  Moreover, Experiment 2 suggests that people 
respond less to monetary value per se and more to social aspect of greed and generosity.  
Similarly, our experiments were small stakes, and future research should generalize the effects to 
large amounts of money and labor; we found that receiving generosity did not differ from 
receiving equal treatment in terms of behavior or affect, but such a difference may emerge for 
extremely generous acts
4.  Finally, while our studies all used similar minimal paradigms, they 
still capture paying it forward in the real world, especially as interactions increasingly take place 
via anonymous internet channels.   
The research presented here provides the first systematic investigation into paying 
forward greed, generosity and equality.  In so doing, it suggests a nuanced view of human nature.  
Equality is paid forward in anonymous situations, suggesting that people will act fairly even 
when no-one is watching—if they have first been treated fairly. Although the recipients of 
generosity act positively—equitably—towards others, our results suggest that the magnitude of 
the positive behavior passed forward is less than what is received, whereas greed is paid forward 
in more equal measure. This asymmetry complements findings in both psychology and biology 
on the effects of socio-negative versus socio-positive outcomes (Rutte, Taborsky & Brinkhof, 
2006), and provides new theoretical directions for evolutionary models of generalized 
reciprocity, which thus far have examined only primarily generous behaviors (Barta, McNamara, 
                                                 
4 However, it is important to note that generous and equal acts are distinguishable by ratings of fairness: generous 
acts are rated as “more than fair” and equal acts as only “fair.” See Experiment 1. Paying it Forward  19 
Huszár, & Taborsky, 2011).  By looking at these three types of behavior, these data also extend 
and quantify past social psychological work on equity with the world (Austin & Walster, 1974) 
and the licensing effects of victimization (Zitek, Jordan, Monin & Leach, 2010), both of which 
suggest that people will act anti-socially if they have been treated less than fairly.  The question 
is under what conditions cause people to be genuinely kind to others (Inbar, Zitek, Jordan, 
Fleuren & Breij, 2012)?   
From the perspective of the person who is paying-it-forward, the asymmetry between 
greed and generosity may stem from a misconception of the threshold required for an act to truly 
reflect paying it forward. The person who awakes to gratefully find his long driveway cleared of 
snow may feel that he has "paid forward" the generous act by brushing off a bit of snow from a 
nearby car, but this discount rate is sufficiently high that the perpetuation of good will likely 
ends there. On the other hand, the person who awakes to find his driveway completely blocked 
from an errant snowplow may pile all that extra snow onto another car, thereby creating a 
significantly longer chain of ill will. This asymmetry suggests that to create chains of positive 
behavior, people should focus less on performing random acts of generosity, and more on 
treating others equally—while refraining from random acts of greed. Paying it Forward  20 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Participant affect after receiving greedy, generous or equal splits of labor. 
 
 
    Split Type   
Affect Type  Greedy  Equal  Generous 
Negative Affect  1.78 (.86)
a  1.15 (.26)
b  1.19 (.29)
b 
Positive Affect  2.56 (.88)
a  2.61 (.78)
a  2.95 (.68)
a 
Anger  1.96 (1.10)
a  1.12 (.46)
b  1.21 (.51)
b 
       
Note: Means (SD).  For each type of affect, means with a different subscript differ at p < .05.    
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Figures 
Figure 1: Money paid forward (out of a possible $6.00) in each condition (Experiment 1).  
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Figure 2: Money paid forward (out of a possible $6.00), after receiving both a random initial 
endowment and a social treatment of either greed or generosity (Experiment 2). 
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Figure 3: Examples of a “good task” (left) and a “bad task” (right) given to participants in 
Experiment 3.  
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Figure 4: Good tasks paid forward (out of a possible 4) in each condition (Experiment 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 